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PRIVACY ISSUES AFFECTING EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES, AND LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS*
By Charles B. Craver**
INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, I wrote an article which dealt in part with privacy questions arising in
employment environments.1 I discussed the right of employers to search employees, their
possessions, and their lockers. I explored employer monitoring of workers through direct
supervisory observation and through the use of closed-circuit television cameras. I also examined
the frequent administration of polygraph tests in employment settings. It is difficult to
comprehend the employment environment changes and the technological developments that have
occurred since the publication of that article.
Since private employers are not formally constrained by constitutional provisions due to
the absence of state involvement, I discussed the ways in which labor arbitrators treated alleged
privacy invasions under collective bargaining agreements. When I published that article in 1977,
22.6 percent of nonagricultural workers were labor union members.2 This meant that almost onequarter of private sector employees enjoyed contractual protection against disciplinary actions
that did not constitute “just cause” or that were based upon improper employer privacy invasions.
Nonunion firms often followed similar practices to discourage their own workers from
contemplating unionization. Over the past thirty years, the union membership rate has declined
from 22.6 percent to 7.8 percent.3 Over ninety percent of private sector personnel no longer enjoy
the privacy protections afforded by collective bargaining relationships. Under common law
doctrines, they constitute “at-will” employees who can be terminated by their employers at any
time for good cause, bad cause, or no cause.4 As a result, they must rely entirely upon legislative

and judicial doctrines to provide them with protection against unreasonable employer activities.
Almost every contemporary employment setting provides employees with access to email and the Internet. These developments allow workers to communicate with each other
electronically, and to reach – and be reached by – parties from around the world. Employees can
easily contact union organizers, and outside organizers can communicate directly with them. To
what extent may firms limit such worker-to-worker or worker-to-organizer communications?
Workers can easily access millions of Internet sites. While most of these are benign, some
are offensive to business firms concerned about their public images. May employers restrict nonbusiness-related employee use of e-mail systems or limit their right to access Internet sites
company officials find offensive? How can firms prevent the improper dissemination of trade
secrets or other confidential information through these electronic media? Workers often wish to
know whether they are being treated the same as other similarly situated employees, and they
compare their compensation packages. May employers discipline individuals who share such
personal and confidential information with others?
Years ago, employers could ask job applicants and current employees about their medical
histories, and they could condition employment upon the satisfactory completion of pre-hire
medical examinations. Although the Americans with Disabilities Act restricts some of these
intrusive measures,5 employers may still require individuals to submit to general medical
examinations after they have been offered employment. If they discover latent conditions or
genetic predispositions to possibly disabling maladies, may they refuse to employ such persons?
Can they use other methods to determine which job applicants might be dishonest or may possess
undesirable personality traits?
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Once a majority of workers in appropriate bargaining units select labor organizations to
be their exclusive bargaining agents under the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.), those
unions have the right to negotiate on their behalf with respect to wages, hours, and working
conditions. When union officials need confidential employer information to help them negotiate
new agreements or to administer existing contracts, they may generally obtain access to that
information. What if the employer declines to provide them with the requested information
because it would divulge corporate secrets or would contravene the privacy rights of employees
or third parties such as customers who have complained about poor employee service?
Privacy-related concerns arise regularly in employment settings. Employers assert private
property rights to restrict the organizing activities of both employees and non-employee union
organizers. They also assert privacy claims when representative labor organizations request
access to confidential company financial records or similarly privileged information. On the other
hand, employers frequently discount employee privacy claims when they monitor worker
activities through closed-circuit television cameras and access to employee e-mail exchanges and
Internet activities. Firms similarly ignore worker privacy interests when they conduct expansive
pre-employment medical examinations and administer tests that purport to measure applicant
honesty and other personality traits.
This article will explore these interesting privacy issues in twenty-first century
employment settings. Part I will consider employer reliance upon privacy interests to restrict
employee and union organizing activities. To what extent may companies limit these rights?
Although representative unions possess the statutory right to seek access to confidential firm data
or private employee information that is relevant to the negotiation of bargaining agreements and
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the administration of those contracts, employers often counter union requests with claims of
confidentiality. When are firm or employee privacy rights likely to outweigh labor organization
bargaining interests?
In Part II, we will consider the degree to which employers may disregard worker privacy
interests when they wish to obtain information of a confidential nature. How can managers
visually or electronically monitor worker job performance or their protected concerted activities?
When can companies access employee e-mail exchanges or Internet activities? When may
employers require job applicants or current employees to submit to medical examinations,
answer personal medical questions, or take polygraph or paper-and-pencil tests that purport to
measure individual honesty or personality traits?
I. EMPLOYER RELIANCE UPON ITS OWN PRIVACY INTERESTS
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.),6 guarantees employees the
right to form, join, and assist labor organizations, to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid
or protection, and to select exclusive bargaining agents to negotiate on their behalf with respect
to wages, hours, and employment conditions.7 Unrepresented workers who contemplate
unionization must generally communicate with union organizers and among themselves.
Individuals supporting collectivization distribute literature explaining the benefits of
unionization, and they solicit employee signatures on authorization cards empowering the named
labor organizations to bargain on their behalf. If a majority of workers in appropriate units of
employees sharing communities of interest execute authorization cards, the designated unions
may request voluntary recognition and exclusive bargaining rights from the relevant employers.
Employers generally reject such requests, requiring the labor organizations to petition the
4

National Labor Relations Board (“Labor Board”) for representation elections.8
A. Traditional No-Solicitation/No-Distribution Restrictions
Employees may not spend their work days handing out union literature or soliciting
authorization card signatures. Employers have the right to restrict these activities to enable
workers to perform their expected job tasks. The Labor Board and the courts have sought to
balance the reasonable expectations of employers against the concerted activity rights of
individuals expected to fulfill their job duties. Firms may thus prohibit all employee literature
distribution and authorization card solicitation during work time, but not during non-work time.9
To avoid litter problems, companies may also limit non-work time literature distribution to nonwork areas of their facilities.10
Retail stores are permitted to impose additional restrictions banning all employee
solicitation and literature distribution an any time in the selling areas to preclude interference
with customers.11 The interest stores have in maintaining beneficial relationships with customers
outweighs the right of workers to engage in concerted activity during their non-work time in the
areas open to prospective buyers. Different considerations have been relied upon to allow health
care institutions to restrict non-work time distribution and solicitation in areas of immediate
patient care, including areas in which such individuals receive treatment.12 This privileged
extension of no-solicitation/no-distribution rules is based upon the privacy interests of patients
who might be adversely affected by worker organizing activities in patient care areas. When
retail stores and health care providers take advantage of their right to establish privileged nosolicitation/no-distribution rules to protect customer relationships or patient privacy, they must
comply with their own privileged rules. If they fail to do so, the Labor Board generally finds it
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impermissible to enforce such privileged prohibitions against employees while the employers
ignore their own rules and undermine their professed need for such special rules.13
Must employers that establish conventional rules banning employee solicitation and
distribution during work time comply with their own rules and refrain from anti-union
proselytizing during these same periods? Since the workers are on company premises and are
being paid to do what their employers tell them to do, it is permissible for firms to contravene
their own employee rules and engage in their own solicitation during work time.14 Only where
there is a significant imbalance in communication opportunities by workers might employers
proselytizing during work time be required to open other communication channels to their
employees.
Employers may also call workers together in massed assemblages during work time and
make “captive audience” speeches expressing their anti-union sentiments. The workers must
listen to these presentations, and firms are not obliged to allow union supporters to respond
unless they have overly broad no-solicitation/no-distribution rules that unfairly – and unlawfully
– create significant communication imbalances.15 The Labor Board may similarly require
employers to provide union supporters with additional communication opportunities when they
engage in anti-union activities during work time in facilities in which they have established
privileged no-solicitation/no-distribution rules pertaining to selling areas of retail stores or
patient care areas of health care facilities, even when the employer activities take place away
from the selling areas or patient care locations, based upon the communication imbalances
created by these extra broad rules.16
When non-employee union organizers attempt to contact employees at work, companies
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assert private property interests to limit their access. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,17 the
Supreme Court acknowledged the sacrosanct nature of private property rights when it severely
limited the ability of non-employee organizers to obtain access to employer premises. The private
property interests of firms would only have to yield to the Section 7 collective action rights of
workers where there were no external communication channels through which organizers could
contact target employees. Since union organizers can use external organizational meetings, home
visits, telephone calls, and direct mailings to reach most workers, rarely do the concerted rights
of employees outweigh the private property rights of employers.
In Jean Country,18 the Labor Board recognized that the traditional Babcock & Wilcox
approach, which was developed for private production facilities not open to the general public,
should not be automatically extended to retail establishments open to prospective customers. The
Board thus decided to establish a three-part balancing test:
[I]n all access cases out essential concern will be [1] the degree of impairment of the
§ 7 right if access should be denied, as it balances against [2] the degree of
impairment of the private property right if access should be granted. We view the
consideration of [3] the availability of reasonably effective alternative means [of
communication] as especially significant in this balancing process.19
Under Jean Country, the Board would first balance the asserted private property interests of the
employer against the significance of the Section 7 right being sought to be advanced by union
organizers. Where such areas as store parking lots were open to the general public and
fundamental organizing efforts were involved, the balance would favor limited non-employee
organizer access to parking lot premises – despite the fact there might be external communication
channels through which union agents could contact target employees. The Labor Board believed
that businesses that had public parking lots did not have the same privacy interests as firms that
7

did not allow non-company personnel to enter their premises.
The Labor Board’s Jean Country decision constituted a modest modification of the
traditional Babcock & Wilcox test and reasonably reflected the transformation of the American
economy from mass production to retail and service. It also recognized the critical fact that the
premises firms sought to protect involved parking lots open to the general public. Despite the fact
this statutory interpretation seemed to constitute a reasonable interpretation of Section 7, a
conservative Supreme Court majority decided not to provide the Labor Board with the traditional
judicial deference given to administrative agencies20 In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,21 the Court held
that the Labor Board was not authorized to alter the standard it had previously articulated in
Babcock & Wilcox. The Justices implicitly recognized that the limited private property rights
associated with parking lots open to the general public outweighed the statutorily protected
organizational rights of employees.
B. Employer Restrictions on Other Forms of Employee Communication
Businesses cite privacy concerns to limit other forms of employee-to-employee
communication. They frequently try to prevent workers from exchanging organizing messages
with coworkers or outside organizers via e-mail systems or through Internet sites. They maintain
that these restrictions are necessary to preserve the privacy of employer-provided computers. If
they limit the use of e-mail and Internet access to firm business, they would probably be safe. On
the other hand, if they allow workers to use e-mail systems for personal use – such as
communicating with friends and family members – they may not discriminatorily preclude
employee communications with other workers or union organizers pertaining to concerted
activities.22 Nonetheless, a number of employees have told me they are forbidden by their
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employers to use company e-mail systems to communicate with each other or with outside
organizations concerning union issues.
Some labor unions have begun to appreciate the organizing potential represented by email transmissions and Internet sites.23 They can use mass mailings to reach all of the employees
of target firms, and they can encourage the workers at those companies to communicate among
themselves with respect to union organizing issues. They can establish Internet sites that explain
the legal rights of employees and the potential benefits of union representation If firms allow
employees access to Internet sites for personal reasons, they cannot forbid them access to unionestablished sites. Such discriminatory policies would contravene the N.L.R.A.
Businesses cite privacy interests to limit employee discussions of other issues that do not
directly involve organizational activities. For example, many prohibit workers from sharing
information pertaining to compensation levels, and they discipline employees who discuss such
“confidential” information. The Labor Board has recognized that workers have the statutorily
protected right to exchange such information for mutual aid and protection.24 Workers may
understandably wish to be sure they are being treated fairly compared to their similarly situated
colleagues, and they may ask each other about their respective salaries and pay increases.25
Employees may also be concerned about possible discrimination prohibited by state and
federal civil rights laws. Employers that fail to provide female employees with compensation
equal to that paid to male employees performing substantially equal work would violate the
Equal Pay Act.26 Intentional pay differentials based upon race, color, religion sex, or national
origin would also contravene Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27
Businesses may not rely upon alleged privacy interests to prevent employees from ascertaining
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whether they are being discriminatorily underpaid.
Section 704(a) of Title VII28 makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against
individuals who oppose what they reasonably think may be discriminatory employment practices.
If workers are disciplined because they share private compensation information with each other
to be sure they are not being treated disciminatorily, they would probably enjoy protection under
that provision. Similar protection would probably be available under Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (F.L.S.A.)29 for workers who exchange information to see if they are being
denied equal pay for equal work in violation of the Equal Pay Act portion of the F.L.S.A
Although that provision is expressly limited to discrimination against individuals who have filed
charges or participated in enforcement proceedings, most courts have appropriately held that
protection should be afforded to persons who have not engaged in such formal actions but who
have otherwise protested what they thought were Equal Pay Act violations.30
C. Employer Compliance with Union Requests for Company Information
When a majority of employees in appropriate units select exclusive bargaining agents,
those unions are authorized to negotiate on their behalf with respect to their wages, hours, and
working conditions. Once collective contracts have been achieved, those representatives have the
right to process grievances that question the manner in which employers have applied particular
contractual provisions. During both the general collective bargaining process and the contract
administration process, union representatives frequently request access to information possessed
by corporate officials. The failure to comply with requests for such information may contravene
Section 8(a)(5),31 constituting breaches of the duty to bargain in good faith.
Employers regularly object to union requests for company records on the ground they
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pertain to information of a private nature. During the actual bargaining process, firms must
provide data relating to wages, job classifications, hours, and working conditions to enable
representative unions to decide what to discuss.32 Although they generally do not have to disclose
confidential financial records, if company bargainers use an inability-to-pay assertion to counter
union demands for wage or benefit increases, they may be obliged to comply with union requests
for sufficient disclosure to support these financial incapacity claims.
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer
should be honest claims. This is true about an asserted inability to pay an increase
in wages. If such an argument is important enough to present in the give and take
of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy.
And it would certainly not be farfetched for a trier of fact to reach the conclusion
that bargaining lacks good faith when an employer mechanically repeats a claim of
inability to pay without making the slightest effort to substantiate the claim.33
During the life of existing agreements, union representatives may request company
information to enable them to decide whether and how to process employee grievances.34
Although they may not have to provide this information in the exact form requested, they do have
to give the union sufficient information to satisfy their representational needs.35 If significant
confidentiality issues are involved, employers may demand that union representatives execute
appropriate confidentiality pledges.36
On other occasions, firms resist union requests for information based upon other privacy
considerations. For example, Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB,37 involved an employer that used
psychological aptitude tests to determine individual job capabilities. After workers filed
grievances challenging certain promotional decisions, the union sought both the test questions
and answers and the test scores of individual employees. Detroit Edison refused to disclose the
test questions and answers except to a qualified psychologist who would be ethically obligated to
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preserve their confidentiality. Since this approach would have provided the union with the
information it needed while also protecting reasonable company interests, this was found to
constitute an appropriate response to the union’s request.38 The company also refused to release
the test scores of individual employees without their express consent to preserve their privacy
expectations, and the Court found this condition to be appropriate.39 It is interesting to note that
while Detroit Edison did not hesitate to administer psychological tests that invaded the individual
privacy interests of its employees, it relied upon the same employee privacy interests to restrict
union access to the resulting test scores.
If employers are able to establish other substantial concerns with respect to union requests
for confidential information, company refusals to disclose such information may be excused. For
example, if firms have been using confidential informants to discover unlawful worker drug
usage, they may refuse to divulge the identities of the under cover operatives.40 The need for
employers to protect the identities of its informants outweighs the union desire to obtain that
information. Similarly, when labor organizations seek the names of individuals being employed
as strider replacements during labor disputes, employers can refuse to supply that information if
they reasonably fear for the safety of the replacement personnel.41
II. EMPLOYER DISCOUNTING OF WORKER PRIVACY INTERESTS
A. Monitoring Employee Work, E-Mail Communications, and Internet Activities
Company managers have the right to watch regular employees to be sure they are
performing their assigned job tasks and are not engaging in impermissible conduct during their
work time. On the other hand, if managers engage in surveillance of protected concerted
activities during the non-work time of employees, their employers will be subject to unfair labor
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practice liability.42 Firms will similarly be found in violation of the N.L.R.A. if they induce or
encourage rank-and-file employees to spy upon the protected activities of their coworkers.
Businesses appreciate the fact that supervisors cannot personally monitor the activities of
their workers at all times, and they often use electronic devices to facilitate this process. Many
companies have installed closed-circuit television cameras to enable managers to observe
different areas simultaneously. These may cover work areas and non-work areas that are open to
public scrutiny such as general production and service spaces, corridors, and parking lots. Since
employees do not have any reasonable expectation of privacy while they are working or walking
in these public areas, these monitoring activities do not contravene their basic rights. Only when
such cameras are surreptitiously placed in areas like locker rooms or lavatories without employee
notification are courts likely to find impermissible invasions of individual privacy interests. In
addition, if cameras or microphones are used to spy upon the protected organizational activities
of employees during their non-work time, unfair practice liability is likely to attach.43
When firms use cameras to monitor open areas of their facilities, they should notify
workers of the fact they are subject to electronic observation. Such disclosures would be unlikely
to undermine company use of this practice to keep track of personnel work habits and to look for
rule violations, and they would serve two important functions. First, they would minimize the
possibility of privacy invasion claims, because workers would know that they are subject to
monitoring in open areas. Second, such notices would deter misconduct such as theft or use of
contraband by individuals who would recognize that such actions could be electronically
recorded.
Software programs make it easy for businesses to monitor every keystroke made by
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employees on their computers.44 Despite the fact that most employees think they enjoy certain
privacy protections when they are at work, they do not.45 As a result, companies can lawfully
keep track of everything they type on their computers. To avoid the aberrational court decision
extending privacy rights to individuals typing on their computers, employers would be wise to
notify personnel of the fact their keystrokes may be monitored.
Although most people believe that employers do not have the right to monitor worker
phone calls,46 many companies monitor telephone calls made by employees or use hidden
microphones to listen to oral conversations involving their workers.47 If they use either of these
practices to spy upon the statutorily protected organizing activities of these individuals, they
would be in violation of the N.L.R.A. They may face additional liability under other federal and
state laws. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act makes it illegal for third
parties to intercept or disclose the telephonic or oral communications made by other persons.48
Such interceptions are not covered, however, if one of the parties to the telephonic or oral
conversation has consented to the interceptions49 or the monitoring firms maintain the
communication systems and the monitoring is carried out in “the normal course of [business].”50
Furthermore, oral communications are not protected when they include statements uttered by
persons who have no reasonable expectation that their conversations will not be overheard or
intercepted by others.51 As a result, if employers notify workers that microphones will be used to
monitor employee communications in the work areas, Title III would probably not apply to those
activities. Most states have laws restricting the secret monitoring of telephonic and oral
communications.52 Some are similar to the prohibitions set forth in the Omnibus Crime Control
Act, while others provide more expansive privacy protections. Employers that violate these laws
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may be subject to significant monetary consequences.
More significant legal issues are likely to arise when firms monitor e-mail exchanges and
Internet access. If the evidence were to suggest that employers have entered these systems to look
for employee organizing activities, there would be clear violations of the N.L.R.A. – unless the
companies prohibited employee use of these systems for all non-business related purposes. The
Labor Board would not require direct proof of such an impermissible motivation, because
managers would rarely confess to such considerations. The impermissible purpose would usually
be inferred from such factors as the initiation of monitoring activity shortly after union
organizing campaigns have commenced. The monetary cost to firms engaged in unlawful
surveillance of protected activities would be minimal, however. The only remedy under the
N.L.R.A. would be a cease and desist order. The only cost to the employers would involve the
attorney fees incurred in defense of their unfair labor practice activities.
The greater monetary risk to employers from access to e-mail and Internet activities by
employees would involve claims of tortious privacy invasions. Most courts have held that
workers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they use computers provided by
their employers.53 Firms could further minimize this problem by explicitly notifying workers that
their e-mail transmissions and Internet accessing are subject to company monitoring. Managers
should promulgate rules explaining which activities are improper and subject to discipline. For
example, use of e-mail communications to sexually harass coworkers, to solicit sex with others,
or to reveal corporate secrets could reasonably be proscribed. Any mention to outside parties of
trade secrets or confidential client information would subject the communicators to discharge.
Company monitoring policies should explicitly preclude the imposition of discipline upon
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employees who engage in statutorily protected activities. For example, if e-mail systems may be
used for non-business related purposes, no individuals should be punished for communicating
with coworkers or outsiders about union organizing. Since firms may lawfully limit worker
discussions of union issues to non-work time, they could do so the same thing with respect to email communications – so long as all non-business use is restricted to non-work times such as
coffee or meal breaks. Since firms tend to be lax in enforcing such limitations and allow workers
to send personal e-mails during their work time, they could not discriminatorily deny them the
same privilege with respect to union organizing exchanges.
Firms monitoring employee Internet access must follow similar procedures. Workers
should be expressly notified by company officials that their Internet activities are subject to
management scrutiny. Appropriate use policies should be articulated to indicate what behavior
will not be tolerated. Disciplinary action should be reserved to clearly improper conduct. If
employees are permitted to enter non-business related Internet sites, they have the right to go into
union organizing sites. If they were punished for doing so, unfair labor practice liability would
result.
B. Medical and Personal Capability Testing
Similar legal issues could arise when corporations administer pre-employment medical
examinations or other tests designed to determine applicant fitness. The Americans with
Disabilities Act (A.D.A.) limits the degree to which firms may expose workers to mandatory
medical examinations or require them to answer general medical questions. Despite these
statutory restrictions – and the obvious invasion of individual privacy involved – many
companies still endeavor to obtain such information.
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Section 12,112(d)(2) of the A.D.A.54 explicitly bans pre-employment medical
examinations and medical inquiries subject to limited exceptions. Employers may describe the
job tasks to be performed and ask each applicant about their ability to perform those tasks.55
Once offers of employment have been extended, firms may require new hires to undergo general
medical examinations – so long as strict protections are followed. All new workers must be
subject to such exams, and the information obtained must be kept in separate and confidential
medical files. Managers may only be informed of specific conditions that may necessitate special
job restrictions, and first aid personnel may be told of conditions that may require emergency
treatment. In no case may the results of such general tests or inquiries be used to discriminate
against otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities who could perform the essential job
functions with or without reasonable accommodations that could be provided without undue
hardship on the employers.56
Once individuals have begun to work for firms, they may not be subjected to mandatory
medical exams of a general nature.57 Employers may only conduct medical tests or ask medical
inquiries that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. This means that they must
restrict their medical examinations to matters that directly relate to the ability of workers to
perform their particular job functions proficiently and safely. Nonetheless, the A.D.A. does have
an exception for drug tests pertaining to unlawful drug usage.58
Now that medical specialists have developed tests to examine the human genome,
employers have the capacity during general medical examinations to look for genetic
predispositions to conditions that might someday affect particular individuals.59 If firms refused
to hire these persons – or used such information from subsequent drug tests to terminate current
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employees – would it violate the A.D.A.? These individuals would not be presently disabled,
because they would not have a medical condition that substantially limits a major life activity,
nor would they have “a record of such impairment.”60 They could argue that their employers
“regard them” as being disabled – as demonstrated by their refusal to hire them or to continue
them in employment. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that people are only “regarded
as” disabled within the meaning of the A.D.A. if employers think they have conditions which, if
they actually had them, would substantially limit major life activities or they have non-disabling
conditions employers erroneously believe are substantially limiting.61 The mere fact that persons
have predispositions to possible future conditions would most likely not fall within either prongs
of this narrow “regarded as” definition.
Courts should acknowledge that the severe limitations imposed on pre- and postemployment medical tests demonstrate a congressional desire to preclude the use of such
information to disadvantage workers based upon unfair employer beliefs. The results of preemployment examinations must be kept in separate and confidential files and many not be used
to discriminate against disabled individuals. Mandating tests of present employees must be
limited to job-related conditions62 or efforts to discover employee use of proscribed drugs.63
These narrow exceptions would suggest that Congress did not intend to allow employers to use
information obtained from such pre- or post-employment medical tests to deprive qualified
people of job opportunities.
Although many employers previously subjected job applicants to polygraph exams, this
practice was prohibited by the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988.64 Polygraph exams
may now be required only in exceptional situations.65 Some firms try to circumvent this
18

restriction through the use of paper and pencil tests that purportedly measure test-taker honesty.
Companies often employ other paper and pencil tests to measure verbal and/or math skills,
applicant knowledge about their areas of specialization, or personality traits. Even though these
practices invade the privacy interests of those being required to participate, employers do not
seem concerned about this issue. Since applicants who do not wish to take such tests can simply
look for work elsewhere, courts would be unlikely to find that these testing practices violate
basic privacy rights.
The use of pre-employment screening mechanisms may contravene Title VII. If such
factors disproportionately disqualify applicants by race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
adversely affected persons could challenge them under the disparate impact proof construct set
forth in Section 703(k)(1)(A).66 Once a disparate impact is established – often using the fourfifths rule under which the pass rate for the disadvantaged group is less than four-fifths the pass
rate for the preferred group67 – the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the
challenged factor is reasonably related to successful job performance. Companies usually have
experts establish statistically significant correlations between the challenged criteria and job
performance. If they are unable to accomplish this, they would have to eliminate those factors.
Even if they can establish reasonable correlations, the claimants can still prevail if they can
demonstrate the availability of equally predictive criteria having a less discriminatory impact.
A similar proof construct is applicable to disabled individuals under the A.D.A. if they
can demonstrate either that they were not given a fair opportunity to demonstrate their true
capabilities 68 or that the challenged factors have a disproportionate impact upon disabled people,
unless the employer can show that the factors are reasonably predictive of job performance.69
19

The Supreme Court recently held that the same disparate impact proof construct is available
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act70 with respect to hiring criteria that
disproportionately disqualify applicants who are forty or older.71 In the same decision, however,
the Court indicated that if employers can articulate rational bases for using such tests, they will
be exempt from liability under the provision allowing employers to make differentiations among
candidates that are “based on reasonable factors other than age . . .”72 It would thus be difficult
for older workers to successfully challenge facially-neutral practices that disproportionately
disqualify older applicants, so long as those criteria appear to be based on reasonable factors
other than age.
When the disparate impact proof construct was initially recognized in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,73 the Court indicated that employers could only sustain factors causing a
disproportionate impact upon protected groups if they could establish that those factors were job
related. The Justices stated that the “touchstone is business necessity,” with firms being required
to show that challenged criteria “have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.”74
When Congress codified this standard in the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments to Title VII, it
used the identical “business necessity” language.75 Nonetheless, lower courts have not applied
this standard literally, because judges realize that a strict “business necessity” approach would
cause the elimination of many hiring standards that are reasonably predictive of actual job
performance.76 Judges have thus interpreted the “business necessity” standard to be satisfied if
employers can actually demonstrate “business convenience.” It is thus quite difficult for persons
challenging facially neutral hiring standards to prevail under the disparate impact construct, so
long as the factors in question are meaningfully predictive of job performance – even if the actual
20

correlation coefficient is relatively modest.
III. NEED FOR MORE EQUITABLE BALANCING OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE
PRIVACY INTERESTS
It should be apparent that employers often cite privacy interests to restrict employee and
non-employee organizer rights. They understandably limit union organizing by employees to
non-work time, to ensure maximum productivity. So long as they do not discriminate in this
regard by allowing employees to solicit and distribute literature on behalf of other non-labor
organizations during their work time, these limitations seem reasonable.
The denial to non-employee organizers of access to company premises also seems
appropriate, where no outside persons are given such access. On the other hand, when members
of the general public are invited onto firm premises by retail establishments, it seems unfair to
deny non-employee organizers any access to these open areas. The Labor Board’s Jean Country
balancing test which was rejected by the Supreme Court in Lechmere constituted an appropriate
way to balance employer privacy interests against the statutorily protected right of organizers to
communicate with store employees. In most cases, access would be limited to public parking
lots. Non-employee organizers would not be allowed to enter the store premises to enable firms
to limit non-business activities in selling areas.
The one area in which Labor Board and court decisions have reasonably sought to
balance employer and worker interests concerns access by representative unions to company
information they need to negotiate new agreements and to administer existing contracts.
Employers must generally comply with union requests for relevant information. When highly
sensitive data are involved, employers may require labor officials to execute confidentiality
21

pledges. When confidential employee information is being sought, union leaders may be required
to obtain the consent of individual workers before they can obtain access to their personal
information.
When employers decide to monitor the work and personal activities of employees while
they are on firm premises, managers tend to discount the privacy interest of their workers.
Companies think that they can visually or electronically observe every aspect of each worker’s
day. The use of closed-circuit cameras is not especially intrusive, so long as two requirements are
satisfied. First, the cameras should only focus on work areas and public areas in which workers
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. They should not be permitted in lavatories, locker
rooms, or similar areas in which employee privacy interests are paramount – except where
employers can demonstrate extraordinary reasons for such intrusions. Second, companies should
be required to notify employees of the specific areas being monitored and to clearly indicatethe
types of conduct that will not be tolerated.
Telephone, e-mail, and Internet monitoring present more complex privacy issues. On the
one hand, firms want to be sure employees are performing their assigned job tasks during work
hours, and they wish to preclude worker use of these media for improper purposes such as the
harassment of coworkers, access to pornographic sites, or the disclosure of confidential corporate
information. On the other hand, workers who are permitted to use these communication channels
for personal reasons have the right to expect their appropriate exchanges with coworkers and
outside persons will remain confidential. How can companies simultaneously honor these
seemingly contradictory firm and employee interests? They should initially notify employees that
their phone calls, e-mail exchanges, and Internet activities are subject to firm monitoring. They
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should also have appropriate use policies indicating the specific activities that will not be
tolerated. To minimize the obvious infringement of employee privacy, companies should assign
designated persons to perform these monitoring functions, and these individuals should be
forbidden to disclose the information they obtain except to proper company officials. Finally,
they should only be permitted to apprise firm managers of actions which contravene the
appropriate use guidelines. All other information they intercept should remain confidential.
In the relatively few employment environments in which unions represent the employees
involved, employers are obliged to negotiate over worker monitoring practices.77 Should they fail
to do so, unfair labor practice liability would result.78 In many cases, labor and management
officials should be able to achieve mutual accommodations of their competing interests. If union
negotiators do not acquiesce to company demands in this area, however, this would not prevent
the establishment of monitoring policies. Once firm officials negotiate in good faith over these
issues and reach bargaining impasses, they would have the right to unilaterally implement the
monitoring policies they offered to union officials.79 For the ninety percent of private sector
workers no longer represented by labor organizations, they would have no meaningful way to
influence corporate monitoring practices. They would have to hope that corporate leaders acted
responsibly in this important area. If not, they would have to exercise the “exit voice” and look
for work elsewhere.
What would motivate corporate leaders to adopt the types of monitoring policies that
would appropriately respect employee privacy interests? The realization that if they fail to do so
and employees become dissatisfied with more intrusive firm monitoring, workers will implore
Congress and state legislatures to enact laws protecting worker privacy rights. Individual firms
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now possess the capacity to formulate appropriate use and monitoring policies tailored to their
particular needs and interests. Legislative bodies, on the other hand, tend to enact expansive
statutes that apply equally to all covered entities. If corporations do not do the right thing
voluntarily, there is a good chance they will have legislative regulations imposed upon them that
will be far more restrictive than the limitations they should have devised on their own to avoid
the unnecessary dilution of employee privacy rights.
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